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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In several opinions handed down in the last two years, 
this court has had occasion to consider the effect of various 
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), on the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts over issues raised by aliens with respect to 
deportation proceedings commenced by the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service ("INS"). Judicial review of cases 
in which the INS commenced deportation proceedings 
against the alien prior to April 1, 1997 is governed by the 
transitional rules of IIRIRA, whereas judicial review of those 
commenced thereafter are governed by the permanent 
judicial review amendments of IIRIRA ("permanent rules"). 
 
The three cases before us today arise under the 
permanent rules, which we have not previously interpreted. 
In particular, they require us to decide whether this court 
has jurisdiction over a petition for review filed by an alien 
who has been ordered deported because s/he has been 
convicted of one or more crimes specified in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") (hereafter referred 
to as an alien with a criminal conviction).1 As a necessary 
component of that decision we must also decide whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We use the term "alien with a criminal conviction" to refer to an alien 
who has been convicted of one or more crimes listed in INA 
S 242(a)(2)(C), AEDPA S 440(a), or transitional rule IIRIRA S 
309(c)(4)(G). 
 
The covered crimes include aggravated felonies, controlled substance 
convictions, certain firearm offenses, miscellaneous national security or 
defense crimes, or two convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude. 
 
                                4 
 
 
the permanent judicial review amendments of IIRIRA divest 
the federal courts of their habeas corpus jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 2241. 
 
In our earlier decisions, we held that AEDPA and the 
transitional rules of IIRIRA deprived us of jurisdiction over 
a petition for review from a final order of removal entered 
against an alien convicted of certain crimes listed in the 
statutes, see Catney v. INS, 178 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 1998), but that the 
district courts retain jurisdiction under the general 
statutory grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241, to review statutory and constitutional challenges to 
the deportation order, see Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 
(3d Cir. 1999); DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
In the cases currently before us, three permanent legal 
residents, Gioacchino Cinquemani, Carmelo Jose 
Rodriguez, and Xu Cheng Liang (collectively "petitioners"), 
have filed petitions for review challenging thefinal orders of 
removal entered against them by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals ("BIA"). Rodriguez has also filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in the district court of New Jersey, 
Rodriguez v. Reno, Civ. No. 99-4300, which is pending. The 
INS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in each 
case before us. We directed that petitioners' cases be 
expedited and consolidated.2 The American Civil Liberties 
Union ("ACLU") filed an amicus brief on the jurisdictional 
issues, as did a group of twenty-six law professors. The 
Citizens and Immigrants for Equal Justice filed an amicus 
brief on the merits of petitioners' claims. We focus on the 
jurisdictional issue, as we cannot consider the merits of the 
petitioners' claims until that is resolved. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A fourth case also consolidated with them arose under the transitional 
rules and was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Vergara-Hernandez v. 
INS, No. 98-3175 (3d Cir. Dec. 27, 1999) (unpublished memorandum 
opinion). 
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II. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Gioacchino Cinquemani, a native and citizen of Italy, 
entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 
1975. He is married and has two United States citizen 
children. He pled guilty on December 4, 1997 in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to 
conspiracy to engage in the business of dealing infirearms 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371 and conspiracy to distribute 
and possess with intent to distribute heroin and morphine 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 846 and 841(b)(1)(B), conduct 
which took place in 1994 and for which he was arrested in 
1994. In March 1998, the INS issued an order to show 
cause why Cinquemani should not be deported based on 
the convictions. 
 
Carmelo Jose Rodriguez, a native and citizen of the 
Dominican Republic, entered the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident in 1983. He also is married and has 
two United States citizen children. He pled guilty in 1993 in 
New Jersey state court to two counts of receiving stolen 
property and to one count of possession of cocaine, pled 
guilty in 1994 in Ohio state court to receiving stolen 
property, and pled guilty in 1995 in New Jersey state court 
to one count of receiving stolen property. He was released 
from prison for the latter crime on March 5, 1997. On July 
1, 1997, the INS initiated removal proceedings against 
Rodriguez on the basis of his criminal convictions. 
 
Xu Cheng Liang, a native and citizen of China, entered 
the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1987. 
He also has two United States citizen children. He was 
allegedly convicted in 1989 in New York state court of 
attempted robbery in the second degree and in May 1997 in 
federal court of conspiracy to distribute heroin and of 
possession with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 
U.S.C. S 846. On February 3, 1998, the INS instituted 
removal proceedings against Liang on the basis of his 
convictions. 
 
At their immigration hearings, both Cinquemani and 
Rodriguez conceded that they were removable aliens based 
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on their criminal convictions, but argued that they should 
be permitted to seek waiver of deportability under former 
INA S 212(c). Rodriguez also requested the discretionary 
relief of cancellation of removal under new INAS 240A, 8 
U.S.C. S 1229b, and adjustment of status in conjunction 
with waiver of inadmissibility under INA S 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 
S 1182(h). At his immigration hearing, Liang denied the 
alleged convictions. The Immigration Judge found the 
government had not met its burden of showing that Liang 
had been convicted in 1989, but found that it had met its 
burden as to the 1997 conviction, which still qualified 
Liang as an aggravated felon subject to removal. Liang then 
sought discretionary relief under former INA S 212(c). 
 
Under former S 212(c), codified at 8 U.S.C.S 1182(c), the 
Attorney General or her delegates, such as the BIA, had 
discretionary authority to waive the deportation of a 
deportable alien because of extraordinary hardship to the 
deportee or his family, or other exceptional circumstances.3 
Although the statutory provision itself referred only to 
aliens in exclusion proceedings, it had been interpreted also 
to apply to aliens in deportation proceedings. See Katsis v. 
INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1070 (3d Cir. 1993); Francis v. INS, 
532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976).4 In 1996, S 212(c) was 
amended by S 440(d) of AEDPA to preclude deportable 
aliens who had been convicted of an aggravated felony or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 212(c) provided, in pertinent part: 
 
       Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily 
       proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, 
       and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven 
       consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the 
Attorney 
 
       General [despite being otherwise excludable] .. . . The first 
sentence 
       of this subsection shall not apply to an alien who has been 
       convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and has served for 
       such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years. 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
 
4. IIRIRA eliminated any statutory distinctions between deportable and 
excludable aliens. Prior to IIRIRA, deportable aliens were defined in 8 
U.S.C. S 1251(a) as those aliens who resided within the United States 
but who could be deported for certain reasons. In contrast, excludable 
aliens were defined in 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a) as those aliens who could be 
denied entry into the United States. 
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two crimes of moral turpitude from receiving waivers, 
regardless of the prison term served for such crimes. See 
DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting 
equal protection challenge to AEDPA S 440(d) because of 
the distinction made between deportable and excludable 
aliens). 
 When, effective April 1, 1997, INA S 212(c) was repealed 
in its entirety by S 304(b) of IIRIRA, it was replaced with 
another discretionary relief provision, INA S 240A. See 
IIRIRA S 304(a) (adding new INA S 240A, codified at 8 U.S.C. 
S 1229b). That section permits the Attorney General or her 
delegates in her discretion to cancel removal in certain 
circumstances, but not when the alien has been convicted 
of an aggravated felony as defined by the INA, making each 
of the petitioners ineligible for relief under that section. As 
a result of these statutory changes the BIA affirmed the 
decisions of the Immigration Judges that the petitioners 
were ineligible for relief under former S 212(c). 
 
Petitioners, relying on the principles set forth in Landgraf 
v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and elaborated 
in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), and Martin v. 
Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999), argue that the BIA erred by 
interpreting IIRIRA S 304(b) to apply retroactively to 
criminal conduct and convictions that occurred before the 
effective date of the section. Thus, petitioners are 
challenging the BIA's legal interpretation of the statute as 
depriving it of discretion rather than the exercise of any 
discretion by the BIA. Rodriguez also argues that if IIRIRA 
S 304(b) does apply to him, then the section is 
unconstitutional because it violates his constitutional rights 
to due process and equal protection.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Rodriguez also argues, for the first time in his reply brief, that 
IIRIRA 
S 304(b) does not apply to him because the INS issued a detainer notice 
prior to April 1, 1997, and therefore that his case was pending when 
S 304(b) became effective. See Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 239-42 
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that AEDPA S 440(d) does not apply retroactively 
to cases pending on the date of AEDPA's enactment); cf. Wallace v. Reno, 
194 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that case was commenced for 
retroactivity purposes when the INS issued an order to show cause even 
though the INS did not file that order to show cause with the 
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With these statutory and constitutional claims in mind, 
we turn to the jurisdictional issue presented in these cases. 
 
III. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
 
Scope of Jurisdictional Inquiry 
 
Although the government's motions to dismiss are 
directed to the pending petitions for review, determination 
of our jurisdiction over the petitions for review is 
inextricably intertwined with the question whether the 
district courts have continued habeas jurisdiction. The 
imperative to avoid a constitutional crisis that might arise 
were the writ of habeas corpus effectively suspended or 
were there no viable means for judicial review of 
constitutional claims necessarily affects, even if indirectly, 
the construction of the relevant statutory provisions. The 
viability of habeas jurisdiction is not a mere hypothetical 
issue, as petitioner Rodriguez has filed, in addition to the 
petition for review before us, a petition for habeas corpus in 
the district court presenting the same or similar issues, 
which that court has not yet decided. 
 
Indeed, recently, in Max-George v. Reno, No. 98-21090, 
2000 WL 220502 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2000), the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to consider the 
tension its reading of the permanent rules as stripping the 
district courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction created with 
the Suspension Clause because the issue was raised on an 
appeal from the denial of habeas corpus rather than on a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
immigration court until after AEDPA's enactment). Because of our 
ultimate disposition of this matter, we do not consider whether 
Rodriguez has waived this claim. See Republic of Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 71 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting 
requirement that appellants raise issues in opening brief). 
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petition for review, as here. The court stated,"had Max- 
George filed a petition for review, we would have to decide 
whether the preclusion of habeas review to him can be 
reconciled both with the constitutional limitation on the 
`suspension' of habeas corpus and the constitutional 
guarantee of due process." Id. at *6. 
 
Rodriguez has attempted to invoke the courts' 
jurisdiction both through filing a petition for review in this 
court and filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
district court. He did move in this court to stay briefing on 
the petition for review until the habeas matter was decided, 
but we proceeded to hear the pending consolidated 
petitions for review. Counsel advised us at the oral 
argument that there has been no action taken in the 
district court, presumably because that court is awaiting a 
decision on the jurisdictional issue in this case. The 
interrelationship between the issues is therefore evident. 
 
The ultimate question in these cases is one of forum: a 
determination of which federal court, if any, has 
jurisdiction to hear petitioners' claims. 
 
B. 
 
AEDPA and the Transitional Rules of IIRIRA 
 
The jurisdictional issue arose with Congress's enactment 
of AEDPA on April 24, 1996. That statute included two 
judicial review provisions relevant to immigration cases. 
Section 401(e) of AEDPA repealed S 106(a)(10) of the INA, 
which had expressly provided for habeas review of 
immigration cases in the federal courts; S 440(a) of AEDPA 
substituted the following language in its place:"Any final 
order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by 
reason of having committed a criminal offense [covered in 
the deportation provisions of the INA] shall not be subject 
to review by any court." 8 U.S.C. S 1105a(a)(10) (repealed by 
IIRIRA S 306(b) with respect to deportation proceedings 
commenced after April 1, 1997). On September 30, 1996, 
Congress enacted IIRIRA, which, as noted above, changed 
many of the amendments that AEDPA had made. 
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In Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 1998), we held that 
AEDPA S 440(a) removed our jurisdiction to review a claim 
of legal error on petition for review brought by an alien with 
a criminal conviction. Id. at 250-51. In that case, we did 
not reach the issue of whether the district courts continued 
to have habeas jurisdiction over those claims under AEDPA 
or the transitional rules of IIRIRA. 
 
In Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999), we 
were faced with that issue. Sandoval had filed a petition for 
review of the BIA's entry of a final order of deportation 
against him. In addition, he had filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in the district court. He argued that 
AEDPA's amendment of S 212(c) to permit discretionary 
waiver of removal for aliens in exclusion proceedings but 
not for aliens in deportation proceedings did not apply to 
cases pending on the date of enactment of AEDPA, and that 
if it did apply to him S 212(c) as amended by AEDPA 
violated equal protection. The district court agreed with 
Sandoval's statutory construction and granted the writ on 
the ground that AEDPA S 440(d) did not apply to cases that 
were pending when the statute was enacted. The 
government appealed, and that appeal was consolidated 
with Sandoval's petition for review. 
 
The government argued that AEDPA and the transitional 
rules of IIRIRA divested the district courts of habeas 
jurisdiction. In forwarding that position, it relied on the 
following statutory provisions: AEDPA SS 401(e) and 440(a), 
referred to above; IIRIRA S 309(c)(4)(G), a transitional rule 
which provides that "there shall be no appeal permitted in 
the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by 
reason of having committed a criminal offense [covered in 
the deportation provisions of the INA]," and IIRIRA S 306(a), 
which amended INA S 242(g) to provide: 
 
       Exclusive Jurisdiction. Except as provided in this 
       section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
       no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or 
       claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the 
       decision or action by the Attorney General to 
       commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 
       removal orders against any alien under this Act. 
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8 U.S.C. S 1252(g). The government contended that AEDPA 
and the transitional rules of IIRIRA stripped the district 
courts of their habeas jurisdiction over all immigration 
cases and placed exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of 
appeals. Further, to avoid a jurisdictional scheme that 
provided no judicial review of constitutional claims brought 
by aliens with criminal convictions, the government 
encouraged us to read an exception for those claims into 
transitional rule S 309(c)(4)(G). 
 
We relied on the "longstanding doctrine disfavoring repeal 
of jurisdictional statutes by implication" as recently 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Felker v. Turpin, 518 
U.S. 651 (1996), to hold, contrary to the government's 
position, that neither AEDPA nor the transitional rules of 
IIRIRA divested the district courts of habeas jurisdiction 
because none of the applicable provisions expressly stated 
that Congress sought to preclude habeas jurisdiction as it 
exists under 28 U.S.C. S 2241. Sandoval , 166 F.3d at 231. 
We examined the Supreme Court's age-old decisions in Ex 
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), and Ex parte 
Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868), together with Felker, 
and concluded: 
 
       Read together, McCardle, Yerger, and Felker establish 
       the propositions that courts should not lightly presume 
       that a congressional enactment containing general 
       language effects a repeal of a jurisdictional statute, 
       and, consequently, that only a plain statement of 
       congressional intent to remove a particular statutory 
       grant of jurisdiction will suffice. 
 
Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 232. 
 
Applying these propositions to the provisions of AEDPA 
and the transitional rules of IIRIRA, we determined that 
"since AEDPA S 401(e) does not manifest an intent to repeal 
the original grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction, currently 
embodied in 28 U.S.C. S 2241, the elimination of INA's 
reference to habeas jurisdiction does not overcome the 
presumption against finding a repeal of habeas corpus by 
implication." Id. at 234-35. Similarly, in analyzing the effect 
of IIRIRA transitional rule S 309(c)(4)(G) and AEDPA S 440(a) 
on the district courts' habeas jurisdiction, we stated that 
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"[n]either of these provisions specifically mentions 
jurisdiction under S 2241. Hence, under Felker and Yerger, 
we do not find a sufficiently clear statement of 
congressional intent to repeal the general grant of habeas 
jurisdiction." Id. at 235. And finally, in analyzing the effect 
of IIRIRA S 306(a), amending INA S 242(g), we determined 
that "[a]s there is no express reference to jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 2241 in this provision, the rule disfavoring 
implied repeals requires us to conclude that jurisdiction 
under S 2241 is preserved . . . ." Id.  at 236. 
 
We held that no repeal would be implied in light of the 
absence of an express revocation of the district courts' 
habeas jurisdiction. Further, we concluded that Sandoval's 
statutory claim, as well as any constitutional claim, was 
cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding, "[i]nasmuch as 
the language of the habeas corpus statute encompasses 
claims that one `is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,' 28 
U.S.C. S 2241(c)(3)." Id. at 238. In doing so, we left open the 
question whether substantial constitutional questions 
might still be brought by an alien with a criminal conviction 
on petition for review. See id. at 238 n.6 ("Because of our 
conclusion that [habeas jurisdiction] covers statutory, as 
well as constitutional claims, we need not decide whether 
the claimed existence of jurisdiction in the courts of 
appeals to review substantial constitutional claims, but not 
statutory claims, would be an adequate alternative."). 
 
Shortly after our decision in Sandoval, the Supreme 
Court decided Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999), in which it rejected the 
government's position that the limitation of court 
jurisdiction in the new INA S 242(g) covered all or nearly all 
deportation claims. Instead, the Court held thatS 242(g), 
which applies to cases under both the permanent and 
transitional rules, covers only three discrete actions of the 
Attorney General: "her `decision or action' to`commence 
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.' " 
Id. at 482. 
 
After American-Arab, we held in Catney v. INS, 178 F.3d 
190 (3d Cir. 1999), that under AEDPA and the transitional 
rules of IIRIRA any challenge by a criminal alien to the 
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BIA's interpretation of the immigration laws or to the 
constitutionality of those laws, even a claim involving 
substantial constitutional issues, must be made through a 
habeas petition rather than through a petition for review. 
By answering the question left open in Sandoval , we 
foreclosed any exception to the bar on petition for review 
jurisdiction over criminal aliens under the transitional 
rules. 
 
Finally, in DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1999), 
the most recent decision of our series on this issue, we 
upheld the jurisdictional analysis of Sandoval  as consistent 
with the Supreme Court's decision in American-Arab. We 
rejected the government's assertion that constitutional and 
statutory challenges fall within the scope of INAS 242(g), 
and concluded that "American-Arab did not affect the 
remainder of Sandoval's rulings." Id.  at 183. 
 
The vast majority of the other courts of appeals have 
adopted principles similar to those enunciated in Sandoval 
and have also found that district courts retain habeas 
jurisdiction after the enactment of AEDPA and IIRIRA's 
transitional rules. See Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 
609 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 28 U.S.C. S 2241 "remains 
an available remedy to those challenging executive 
detention" under AEDPA and the transitional rules of 
IIRIRA); Pak v. Reno, 196 F.3d 666, 673 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(following reasoning of Sandoval and Goncalves v. Reno, 
144 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 1998), and concluding that neither 
AEDPA amendments nor transitional rules of IIRIRA divest 
district courts of habeas jurisdiction because the applicable 
sections "[do] not refer to S 2241"); Bowrin v. INS, 194 F.3d 
483, 489 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) ("Finding no . . . 
specific reference to S 2241, we apply the long-standing rule 
disfavoring repeal of jurisdictional provisions by 
implication."); Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene , 190 F.3d 1135, 
1145-46 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that "the lack of any 
mention of S 2241 habeas review in the plain language of 
the statute, combined with the long historical precedent 
surrounding habeas corpus review in immigration cases, 
establishes that traditional habeas review underS 2241 
survived the enactment of AEDPA S 440(d) and IIRIRA 
S 309(c) [the transitional rules]") petition for cert. filed, 
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___ USLW ___ (U.S. Jan. 31, 2000) (No. 99-7964); Shah v. 
Reno, 184 F.3d 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1999) ("In sum, we hold 
that Congress in enacting AEDPA and IIRIRA in 1996, did 
not clearly and expressly repeal 28 U.S.C. S 2241."); Mayers 
v. INS, 175 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
AEDPA's repeal of INA S 106(a)(10) did not repeal district 
courts' habeas jurisdiction for cases falling under the 
transitional rules of IIRIRA); Henderson v. INS , 157 F.3d 
106, 118-22 (2d Cir. 1998) (relying on earlier decision in 
Jean-Baptiste v. Reno, 144 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 1998), and 
concluding that without express reference to S 2241 it 
would not find bar on federal courts' habeas jurisdiction), 
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1141 (1999); Goncalves v. Reno, 144 
F.3d 110, 119-23 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding that repeal of 
INA S 106(a)(10) did not repeal habeas jurisdiction because 
there is no explicit reference in AEDPA to habeas 
jurisdiction under S 2241), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 1140 
(1999); cf. Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299 
(5th Cir. 1999) (holding that habeas jurisdiction exists 
under transitional rules but implying that the court might 
conclude in a case under the permanent rules that 
language in S 242(g) and S 242(b)(9) is sufficiently express 
to preclude habeas jurisdiction). Only the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, interpreting AEDPA and the 
transitional rules, has held to the contrary. See La Guerre 
v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that AEDPA 
S 440(a), amending INA S 106(a), divested district courts of 
habeas jurisdiction), cert. denied, 68 USLW 3154 (U.S. Feb. 
22, 2000) (No. 99-418). 
 
C. 
 
The Permanent Rules of IIRIRA 
 
Because deportation proceedings were not initiated 
against any of the petitioners until after April 1, 1997, the 
permanent rules apply to their cases. The government 
invokes several jurisdictional provisions that are part of the 
permanent rules in support of its motions to dismiss. It 
argues that under these provisions, "the court of appeals is 
now the exclusive forum for all immigration matters," 
including "the interpretation of statutory and constitutional 
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issues under 28 U.S.C. S 2241." Respondent's Brief at 12. 
According to the government, therefore, the permanent 
rules divest the district courts of their habeas jurisdiction 
where the transitional rules, as we held in Sandoval, did 
not. Further, the government asserts that "[o]nce the court 
determines that a petitioner is an alien who has been 
ordered removed for a qualifying criminal conviction," the 
court of appeals lacks jurisdiction "to review any other 
challenge the petitioner might raise to his removal 
proceedings." Id. at 4. It argues that because the 
permanent rules were not before us in Sandoval , that 
decision is inapplicable. 
 
The first of the provisions to which the government 
refers, INA S 242(a)(2)(C), provides: 
 
       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court 
       shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of 
       removal against an alien who is removable by reason of 
       having committed a criminal offense covered in section 
       1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this 
       title, or any offense covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
       of this title for which both predicate offenses are, 
       without regard to their date of commission, otherwise 
       covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title. 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1252(a)(2)(C). 
 
INA S 242(a)(1), also in the permanent rules, provides: 
 
       Judicial review of a final order of removal (other than 
       an order of removal without a hearing pursuant to 
       section 1225(b)(1) of this title) is governed only by 
       chapter 158 of Title 28, except as provided in 
       subsection (b) of this section and except that the court 
       may not order the taking of additional evidence under 
       section 2347(c) of Title 28. 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1252(a)(1). 
 
The government places its principal reliance for its 
argument that the permanent rules divest the district 
courts of habeas jurisdiction on INA S 242(b)(9), which 
provides: 
 
       Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, 
       including interpretation and application of 
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       constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from 
       any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an 
       alien from the United States under this subchapter 
       shall be available only in judicial review of afinal order 
       under this section. 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1252(b)(9). The government argues that because 
INA S 242(b)(2) requires that all petitions for review "be filed 
with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which 
the immigration judge completed the proceedings," 8 U.S.C. 
S 1252(b)(2), S 242(b)(9) necessarily divests the district 
courts of their habeas jurisdiction. 
 
There is no reason why the jurisdictional ruling in this 
case under the permanent rules should be any different 
than that we reached under the transitional rules. Although 
the text of these provisions differs somewhat from the 
sections of the transitional rules that were considered in 
Sandoval, those sections, AEDPA SS 440(a), 401(e), IIRIRA 
S 309(c)(4)(G), and INA S 242(g), used language comparably 
comprehensive. Indeed, the phrase "notwithstanding any 
other provision of law" in INA S 242(a)(2)(C) also appears in 
INA S 242(g), which we did consider in Sandoval. See 
Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 236-38. That phrase did not 
persuade us then to hold that Congress had implicitly 
repealed S 2241 habeas jurisdiction; there is no reason why 
it would have a different effect now. 
 
The difficulty with the government's effort to convince us 
that the language of S 242(b)(9), or of any of the permanent 
rules, requires a different result than that reached in 
Sandoval is that no language in the permanent rules fills 
the gap we found in Sandoval. None of the provisions, 
including INA S 242(b)(9), expressly refers to habeas 
jurisdiction or to 28 U.S.C. S 2241. None expressly revokes 
habeas jurisdiction. 
 
As we explained in Sandoval, a repeal of habeas 
jurisdiction will not be found by implication. This is the 
holding of the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Felker, 
518 U.S. 651. In that case, the Supreme Court considered 
whether Title I of AEDPA, which imposed significant 
restrictions on the availability of the writ of habeas corpus, 
deprived the Court itself of jurisdiction to entertain original 
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habeas petitions. The Court noted that no provision of Title 
I mentioned its authority to hear habeas petitionsfiled as 
original matters. Guided by its earlier decision in Ex Parte 
Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868), the Court therefore held 
that: 
 
       Although [AEDPA] precludes us from reviewing, by 
       appeal or petition for certiorari, a judgment on an 
       application for leave to file a second habeas petition in 
       district court, it makes no mention of our authority to 
       hear habeas petitions filed as original matters in this 
       Court. As we declined to find a repeal [of our power to 
       entertain habeas petitions in Yerger] we decline to find 
       a similar repeal of S 2241 of Title 28 . . . by implication 
       now. 
 
Id. at 661. 
 The holding of the Supreme Court is clear. A repeal of 
habeas jurisdiction can only be effected by express 
congressional command. That was the basis for our 
decision in Sandoval. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 232 
(examining the propositions established by the Supreme 
Court in Felker, Yerger, and McCardle). That holding is as 
applicable to the permanent rules as it was to the 
transitional rules in Sandoval. 
 
The government is correct that Sandoval involved only 
the transitional rules, not the permanent rules, but the 
legal principle relied on by this court transcends the narrow 
context of the transitional rules. See, e.g., John Hancock 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("To be sure, there may be a number of factual grounds to 
distinguish our holding in [an earlier case], but the legal 
principle announced in that case directly controls the issue 
presented . . . ."). We unquestionably interpreted Felker in 
Sandoval as requiring an explicit reference to habeas 
jurisdiction or its statutory provision in order tofind an 
express congressional intent to repeal. As this court has 
frequently noted, "[A] panel of this court cannot overrule a 
prior panel precedent." O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 
F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981); see Internal Operating 
Procedures, United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, Rule 9.1 ("[T]he holding of a panel in a reported 
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opinion is binding on subsequent panels. . . . Court in banc 
consideration is required [to overrule such a holding]."). 
 
This is not a case in which there have been "intervening 
developments" that counsel reevaluation of the underlying 
premise of Sandoval. Cf. Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 
854, 858-59 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that subsequent 
statutory amendment and Supreme Court precedent 
permitted reevaluation of earlier panel decision). 
Notwithstanding the government's suggestion to the 
contrary, nothing in the Supreme Court's 1999 decision in 
American-Arab, 525 U.S. 471, bears on our reasoning in 
Sandoval. 
 
American-Arab arose after the INS instituted deportation 
proceedings against several aliens who belonged to the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a group that 
the government characterized as a terrorist group. The 
aliens filed suit in district court seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief on the ground that the INS was selectively 
enforcing immigration laws against them in violation of 
their First and Fifth Amendment rights. After Congress 
passed IIRIRA, the government sought to dismiss the case 
for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that INA S 242(g), made 
applicable by S 306(c)(1) of IIRIRA to the aliens' cases, 
deprived the courts of jurisdiction over the selective 
enforcement claim. In reconciling an apparent conflict 
between IIRIRA S 306(c)(1), which made INAS 242(g) 
applicable to all cases, including those pending on the date 
of IIRIRA's enactment, and transitional rule S 309(c)(1)(B), 
which stated the general rule that the amendments of 
IIRIRA would not apply to pending cases, the Supreme 
Court rejected a broad reading of INA S 242(g). The Court 
held that S 242(g) applied only to "three discrete events 
along the road to deportation": the Attorney General's 
uniquely discretionary decisions to commence proceedings, 
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. Id.  at 482. It 
compared the limited scope of that section with the more 
expansive reach of S 242(b)(9) (a "zipper" clause). Id. at 483. 
Because S 242(g) did apply to the Attorney General's 
decision to prosecute the plaintiff aliens, the Court held 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' 
suit. 
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The government argues that it is clear from the Court's 
characterization in American Arab of S 242(b)(9) as an 
"unmistakable `zipper' clause," id., that the courts of 
appeals are the exclusive forum for all immigration claims. 
That reading attributes to the discussion in American Arab 
a meaning that extends beyond the matter at issue, which 
was the interplay between IIRIRA SS 306(c)(1), 309(c)(1)(B), 
and INA S 242(g). 
 
The language of INA S 242(b)(9), even without the Court's 
comparing it with that of S 242(g), makes it evident that 
S 242(b)(9) was intended to apply to a broader range of 
decisions than the three categories to which the Court 
referred in American-Arab. However, that does not mean 
that the Court intended to hold, without explicit discussion, 
that S 242(b)(9) has the radical effect of eliminating habeas 
jurisdiction. In fact, the underlying suit in American-Arab 
was not a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. S 2241 but a 
civil suit for injunctive and declaratory relief that relied for 
its jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. S 1331. The Supreme Court 
never considered whether IIRIRA divests the district courts 
of habeas jurisdiction. Rather, the Court noted that there 
was disagreement in the courts of appeals on the issue and 
expressed no view on the issue's resolution. See id. at 480 
& n.7. Although we agree that S 242(b)(9) clearly expresses 
congressional intent that judicial review of questions arising 
from a proceeding brought to remove an alien be conducted 
under the INA in the courts of appeals, we do not agree 
that it clearly expresses congressional intent that the 
district courts be divested of their habeas jurisdiction 
under S 2241, the issue considered here. 
 
The government notes that the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit relied on S 242(b)(9) in holding that the 
district courts no longer have habeas jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 2241 to review any challenge to an alien's removal 
proceedings. See Richardson v. Reno (Richardson II), 180 
F.3d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 
USLW 3367 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1999) (No. 99-887). Richardson, 
a thirty-year permanent legal resident in this country with 
convictions for firearms and drugs offenses, was detained 
by the INS as he attempted to re-enter the United States 
after a two-day trip to Haiti. He filed a petition for a writ of 
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habeas corpus, asserting that the INS's illegal detention, 
denial of admission, and denial of a bond hearing violated 
his constitutional and statutory rights as a lawful 
permanent resident alien. Because Richardson's removal 
proceedings began in October 1997, the permanent rules 
applied to his case. 
 
When the case first came to the Eleventh Circuit, the 
court held that INA S 242(g) repealed district court habeas 
jurisdiction. See Richardson v. Reno (Richardson I), 162 
F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1998). Richardson I was vacated by 
the Supreme Court, and remanded for reconsideration in 
light of its decision in American-Arab. See Richardson v. 
Reno, 119 S.Ct. 2016 (1999). On remand, the court of 
appeals recognized that, in light of the Supreme Court's 
narrow reading of S 242(g), that section did not divest the 
district court of habeas jurisdiction over Richardson's case. 
Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed its earlier decision on the 
ground that Richardson I rested not just on its 
interpretation of INA S 242(g) but also of INAS 242(b)(9) as 
well as the "overall judicial review scheme enacted in INA 
S 242(b)." Richardson II, 180 F.3d at 1314. The court 
concluded that "[a]ny constitutional infirmities Richardson 
perceives in th[e] INA-proscribed judicial review must be 
raised in an attack on the constitutionality of INA 
S 242(a)(2)(C) only in the court of appeals and only after a 
final removal order." Id. at 1316 (quoting Richardson I, 162 
F.3d at 1376). 
 
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
has followed the Eleventh Circuit in holding that under the 
permanent rules district courts are divested of their habeas 
jurisdiction. See Max-George v. Reno, No. 98-21090, 2000 
WL 220502 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2000). Although the Fifth 
Circuit had interpreted the transitional rules as preserving 
the district courts' habeas jurisdiction, it had foreseen the 
possibility of a different result under the permanent rules. 
See Requena-Rodriquez, 190 F.3d at 305-06. Thus, its 
decision in Max-George was not unexpected. It reasoned 
that the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of 
law" in INA S 242(a)(2)(C), which had not appeared before it 
under the transitional rules, "clearly precludes habeas 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2241." Max-George, 2000 WL 
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220502 at *4.6 In contrast, as we noted above, we did 
consider that phrase, which appears in S 242(g), in 
Sandoval. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 236-38. 
 
Moreover, the "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
law" phrase that the court in Max-George found dispositive 
does not stand alone. The language that begins 
S 242(a)(2)(C) reads: "Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . ." 8 
U.S.C. S 1252(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). In Sandoval, we 
reviewed the history of the Supreme Court's consistent 
affirmation since at least as far back as 1888 of the right 
of aliens to availability of the writ of habeas corpus in the 
district courts despite statutory language that restricted or 
eliminated judicial review of executive action in immigration 
matters. Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 233-34. We stated that 
when viewed in light of the history of the Court's treatment 
of habeas jurisdiction in deportation cases, the references 
to "review" in AEDPA and to "appeal" in IIRIRA are properly 
understood as relating to judicial review under the APA. Id. 
at 235. We continued, "This is so because in the 
immigration context, the Court has historically drawn a 
sharp distinction between `judicial review' -- meaning APA 
review -- and the courts' power to entertain petitions for 
writs of habeas corpus." Id. The court's conclusion in Max- 
George that the writ of habeas corpus "is merely an `other 
provision of law,' " Max-George, 2000 WL 220502 at *4, that 
can be swept away by the phrase "[n]otwithstanding any 
other provision of law" fails to recognize or give effect to this 
historical distinction maintained by successive Supreme 
Court opinions. 
 
The holdings of both Richardson cases and Max-George 
that Congress need not mention habeas or S 2241 to repeal 
the district courts' habeas jurisdiction are at odds not only 
with our reasoning in Sandoval but with the reasoning of 
the other courts of appeals that have read the Supreme 
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6. We note in passing that Max-George had already been deported and 
the government argued that the case was moot. The court overcame the 
mootness argument by holding that a collateral consequence of his 
deportation was his future inadmissibility as a matter of law, whether he 
chose to return or not. 
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Court's precedent in Yerger and Felker  to require explicit 
statutory reference to habeas or S 2241 to effect 
congressional repeal of habeas jurisdiction. See Magana- 
Pizano, 200 F.3d at 608-09 (interpreting Felker to require 
explicit reference to S 2241 to effect repeal of habeas corpus 
jurisdiction, noting that "[p]resumably, the holding in 
Felker placed Congress on notice that it could repeal 
habeas jurisdiction under S 2241 only by express 
command, and not by implication"); Pak, 196 F.3d at 673 
("Although AEDPA S 401(e) pointedly refers to INA 
S 106(a)(10), it does not refer to S 2241. Thus, despite the 
fact that AEDPA S 401(e) expressly repealed habeas 
jurisdiction under INA S 106(a)(10), absent a clear 
statement from Congress, we decline to interpret that 
provision as also repealing general habeas jurisdiction 
under S 2241."); Bowrin, 194 F.3d at 489 ("We believe that 
had Congress intended to eliminate all habeas jurisdiction 
under S 2241, it would have done so by using the same 
explicit references it used to repeal INA S 106(a)(10)."); 
Jurado-Gutierrez, 190 F.3d at 1145-46 ("Wefind the lack of 
any mention of S 2241 habeas review in the plain language 
of the statute, combined with the long historical precedent 
surrounding habeas corpus review in immigration cases, 
establishes that traditional habeas review underS 2241 
survived the enactment of AEDPA S 440(d) and IIRIRA 
S 309(c)."); Shah, 184 F.3d at 724 ("AEDPA rather pointedly 
refers only to Section 106(a)(10) of the old Act. No reference 
is made to the general federal habeas corpus statute, 
though that statute was for decades routinely used to 
review executive decisions in immigration matters . . . ."); 
Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 119 ("Felker makes clear that if 
Congress intends to repeal or restrict habeas jurisdiction 
under S 2241, it must say so explicitly."). But see LaGuerre, 
164 F.3d at 1038-39 (holding that AEDPA SS 440(a) and 
401(e) divested the district courts of habeas jurisdiction, 
even without explicit reference to S 2241). 7 
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7. It is of some interest that while Richardson I was awaiting 
reconsideration in light of American-Arab, the Eleventh Circuit decided 
Mayers v. INS, 175 F.3d 1289, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 1999), a 
transitional rule case, in which the court applied the presumption 
against implied repeal of habeas jurisdiction articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Felker and held that neither AEDPA nor the transitional rules 
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The government argues that we should adopt the holding 
of Richardson II (and presumably now would include Max- 
George) rather than adhere to the reasoning we articulated 
in Sandoval. As we have explained, we see no reason to 
abandon the path taken in Sandoval. We continue to 
believe that had Congress intended to eliminate all habeas 
jurisdiction under S 2241, it would have done so by making 
its intent explicit in the language of the statute. 
Furthermore, as we recognized in Sandoval, this approach 
obviates the serious constitutional problems that would 
arise were we to adhere to our previous opinions holding we 
have no jurisdiction over petitions for review filed by an 
alien with a criminal conviction and read the permanent 
rules to strip the district courts of habeas jurisdiction. 
 
The Suspension Clause provides that "[t]he Privilege of 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it." U.S. Const. art. I, S 9, cl. 2. The Max- 
George court recognized that "[t]o some degree, IIRIRA's 
stripping of S 2241 jurisdiction implicates the guarantee 
that the `Privilege of the Writ' preserved by the Constitution 
cannot be suspended," but it then stated that the 
distinction between the scope of the writ of habeas corpus 
preserved in the Constitution and the scope of the writ 
granted by S 2241 "is immaterial when considered in the 
immigration context" where Congress may make rules "that 
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens." Max-George, 
2000 WL 220502 at *6 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). We agree, of course, with the proposition that 
habeas corpus need not preserve review of discretionary 
decisions, but to the extent the court's discussion suggests 
that aliens are not entitled to the constitutional protection 
of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court cases cited and 
discussed in detail in Sandoval, see 166 F.3d at 233-34, 
pronounce precisely the opposite. See, e.g., United States v. 
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of IIRIRA divested the district courts of habeas jurisdiction because none 
of the provisions expressly referred to 28 U.S.C.S 2241 or habeas 
jurisdiction. When the court re-affirmed its Richardson I analysis of 
Felker in Richardson II, it sought to distinguish Mayers on factual and 
statutory grounds. See 180 F.3d at 1316 n.6. 
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Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621(1888) (alien entitled to writ of 
habeas corpus to reenter United States); Nishimura Ekiu v. 
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) ("An alien 
immigrant, prevented from landing . . . is doubtless entitled 
to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the 
restraint is lawful."); Heikkila v. Barber , 345 U.S. 229, 234- 
35 (1953) (statute conferring finality on deportation 
decisions of Attorney General precluded "judicial 
intervention in deportation cases except insofar as it was 
required by the Constitution"). 
 
The government asserts that our concerns about avoiding 
constitutional problems are unfounded because the judicial 
review provisions applicable to the cases before us can be 
read to satisfy the Suspension Clause. Congress may divest 
the district courts of habeas jurisdiction without violating 
the Suspension Clause so long as it substitutes"a collateral 
remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test 
the legality of a person's detention." Swain v. Pressley, 430 
U.S. 372, 381 (1977). 
 
Although the courts of appeals generally retain 
jurisdiction under new INA S 242(a)(1) to review an alien's 
challenge to his or her final order of removal via the alien's 
petition for review, a petition for review brought by an alien 
with a criminal conviction is excepted. New INA 
S 242(a)(2)(C) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review 
any final order of removal against an alien who is 
removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense 
covered in [various sections of the INA]." 8 U.S.C. 
S 1252(a)(2)(C). 
 
The government argues that, irrespective of this 
limitation on our petition for review jurisdiction, the courts 
of appeals retain jurisdiction under S 242 over petitions for 
review "to test the legality of a criminal alien's removal 
order." Respondent's Brief at 20. Apparently in response to 
the strong argument made by the amici ACLU and law 
professors that if the INA provides no review for petitioners' 
statutory as well as constitutional claims the Suspension 
Clause would not be satisfied, the government argues that 
we do have jurisdiction to review the merits of petitioners' 
statutory as well as constitutional claims in such cases. It 
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asserts that under S 242(a)(2)(C) we have jurisdiction to 
determine whether each petitioner "(1) [is] an alien, (2) is 
removable, and (3) is removable by reason of having 
committed a qualifying crime. . . ." Respondent's Brief at 
19. According to the government, the determination of 
removability is "very broad," permitting us to judge the 
merits of petitioners' statutory and constitutional 
challenges on a petition for review. Transcript of argument, 
Dec. 20, 1999 at 61. 
 
If we were to accept this suggestion, it would create the 
awkward situation of requiring analysis of the merits of a 
petitioner's challenge in making a preliminary jurisdictional 
determination. Moreover, the government's position at this 
juncture is difficult to reconcile with its earlier position 
taken in Sandoval that at most the courts of appeals could 
review "substantial constitutional" issues on petition for 
review.8 Our response in Sandoval, noting that neither the 
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8. The government's different positions here and in Sandoval on the 
issue of the courts' jurisdiction to hear a statutory claim raised by an 
alien with a criminal conviction is illustrative of its vacillation on 
this 
 
issue. In its brief on appeal from the district court's ruling on 
Sandoval's 
habeas petition, the government argued that there was no jurisdiction 
either in the court of appeals or in the district court to hear aliens' 
statutory claims, maintaining that the Suspension Clause was not 
implicated because "judicial review required under the Suspension 
Clause extends only to claims of substantial constitutional error 
amounting to a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Government Brief at 
30, Sandoval v. Reno, No. 98-1099. It took the same position in its brief 
on Sandoval's petition for review, where it stated,"Sandoval's contention 
that the Board erred as a matter of statutory construction in concluding 
that AEDPA S 440(d) applies to cases pending upon enactment is a non- 
reviewable claim of legal error." Government Brief at 5, Sandoval v. INS, 
No. 98-3214. At argument in the cases before us, the government took 
a considerably more expansive view of the scope of our jurisdiction to 
hear the petitioners' statutory claims, stating"[I]n determining whether 
a criminal alien is removable, you need to look at whether his removal 
order is constitutionally and statutorily legal , whether it's valid or 
not, 
before you can decide whether the bar applies to him." Transcript of 
argument, Dec. 20, 1999 at 66 (emphasis added). On several occasions 
during the argument, the government set forth its position that "there is 
review that is commensurate with 2241 review in this court under 242. 
This court can look at and answer any question that this alien could 
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statute nor the legislative history support such a statutory 
construction, is even more applicable here. 
 
       This argument must fail because of the absence of any 
       support, either in the statute or in the legislative 
       history. The government's briefs cite no provision of 
       AEDPA or IIRIRA that supports its reading and it 
       conceded at oral argument that there is no specific 
       provision granting us jurisdiction over substantial 
       constitutional claims. Although the government's 
       argument would have more force if there were a 
       constitutional imperative to read the 1996 statutes in 
       that manner, our conclusion that the statutes have left 
       habeas jurisdiction intact in the district courts removes 
       any such imperative. 
 
Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 237-38. For the same reason, we do 
not see how INA S 242 can support the broader position the 
government now takes. 
 
On the contrary, the language of S 242(a)(2)(C) makes 
clear that we lack jurisdiction over the petitions for review 
filed by Cinquemani, Rodriguez, and Liang in the cases 
before us. The effect of S 242(a)(2)(C) is similar to that of 
IIRIRA S 309(c)(4)(G), which we interpreted in Catney, 178 
F.3d 190, and to that of AEDPA S 440(a), which we 
interpreted in Morel, 144 F.3d 248. 
 
Like Catney and Morel, petitioners in the cases before us 
do not dispute that they are aliens with criminal 
convictions that render them removable under the INA. In 
other words, they do not dispute that they are aliens who 
are "removable by reason of having committed a[specified] 
criminal offense." 8 U.S.C. S 1252(a)(2)(C). Rather, they 
raise statutory challenges to the BIA's interpretation of 
recent amendments and constitutional challenges to the 
statute itself, seeking the availability of a discretionary 
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raise under 2241." Id. at 65. The government's fluctuation strengthens 
our decision to base our holding on our interpretation of the statutory 
language as preserving habeas jurisdiction under Felker rather than on 
the government's concessions at oral argument -- concessions from 
which it might retreat in the next case. 
 
                                27 
 
 
waiver under former INA S 212(c). We see no material 
distinction between the transitional rules and the 
permanent rules governing petitions for review of an alien 
with a criminal conviction. Accordingly, we hold that we 
lack jurisdiction under S 242(a)(2)(C) over the petitions for 
review. 
 
IV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We recognize that our decision perpetuates the division 
in the courts of appeals interpreting the amendments to the 
immigration laws. Indeed, were the judges' preferences 
determinative, it is likely that many would opt for a system 
under which aliens' challenges to nondiscretionary 
immigration decisions, both statutory as well as 
constitutional, would be reviewed directly in the courts of 
appeals. But that is not the way in which we read the 
legislation that Congress has enacted, and it is our 
obligation to interpret the statutes we are given, while at 
the same time interpreting the Constitution in accord with 
the Supreme Court's precedent. 
 
Because we lack jurisdiction under INA S 242(a)(2)(C) over 
the petitions for review brought by Cinquemani, Rodriguez, 
and Liang challenging their final orders of removal, the 
petitions will be dismissed without prejudice to Rodriguez's 
pending petition under 28 U.S.C. S 2241 for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
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